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August 15, 1970

MEMORANDUM FORMMR. KISSINGER

OSD, DEA Reviews  
Completed

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Heroin Task Force Meeting, Monday, August 17, at 3 p.m.

In view of the apparent strong differences of opinion within the bureaucracy on our goals and interests in Turkey, you requested the Working Party of the Task Force to prepare a memo setting out an agreed factual assessment and alternative courses of action. This memo and a covering summary are at Tab A. On August 7, you sent the memo to all members of the Task Force and suggested that it serve as the basis for the meeting (Tab B). The last Task Force meeting was on June 9, was chaired by Dr. Moynihan, and covered a variety of subjects other than Turkey (a summary is at Tab C).

Your main purpose at the meeting will be to reach agreement that we will not apply sanctions to Turkey over the opium issue. In recent months, Treasury has been attempting to hold up PL 480 programs for Turkey and desires even stronger measures. It will also be important to secure the agreement of all members that every effort should be made to prevent publicity of our dealings with the Turks on this, so that unfortunate effects of the recent extremely adverse Turkish reaction to public pressure can be reduced.

During the meeting, Treasury (Rossides) will insist most strongly on using economic sanctions, and will charge that we have been too soft on the Turks. 25X1

[redacted] Defense will probably argue against any actions that might 25X1 make the Turks become uncooperative with respect to our military [redacted] activities in Turkey. State will argue that the Turks are already taking helpful actions, and that they can be brought along further without sanctions or massive financial incentives. 25X1

OSD & DOJ review complete  
pages 1-3\* \*  
On-file TREA, NSC,  
HHS/HEW release  
instructions applyTalking Points

It might be best to begin the meeting by asking Ambassador Handley to present an assessment of the current situation in Turkey.

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-2-

Following that, turn to the Working Party memorandum (Tab A) and refer to some of the more important assessments in the memo:

-- that Turkey's illicit opium must be cut before more than marginal success can be achieved in cutting other sources of illegal opium traffic (p. 11);

-- that the increased amounts of opium available from Afghanistan, India, Iran, Pakistan and Thailand, for example, are entirely capable of filling the gaps left by the elimination of illicit Turkish opium (p. 4);

-- that even if we got the Turks to plow under this year's fall planting of poppy, we have no basis to conclude that there will be any reduction in heroin imports into the US in the foreseeable future as a result (p. 11).

Turn to the question of our objectives. Five alternatives are listed on page 10. Before inviting discussion, you may wish to make the following comments:

-- the first two goals listed appear wholly unrealistic since they would require the Turkist actions inconsistent with the Government decree of July, under which plantings were permitted at least through 1971 in four provinces;

-- it would seem sounder for us to concentrate our efforts on eliminating the diversion of opium into illicit channels, through licensing (such a law may be passed by the Parliament in November) and other control measures in the way that the Indians seem to be able to control their opium production (the largest in the world);

-- admittedly it is somewhat artificial to consider goals without reference to methods, but it might be of use to see if the meeting could reach a consensus on a goal, preferably one that would place prime stress on eliminating illicit diversion, and secondary emphasis on eliminating production at some point, perhaps by 1972.

Reaching the issue of the proper methods to employ, you might wish to make the following comments:

-- you would hope that we could rule out the so-called 'stick' approach (p. 12), since even the threat of sanctions would have very serious implications for our foreign relations, military  interests in Turkey 25X1 (set forth in detail in Annex C);

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CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

-- the 'stick/carrot' approach (p. 14) contains much of the same difficulty, but compounds it by a rather transparent attempt to split the military elements of the Turkist establishment from the civilian elements -- dangerous effort unlikely to succeed;

-- it seems hard to distinguish between the 'carrot' approach (p. 13) and the last alternative (p. 15), except that in the former we seem to be offering more money and a slightly more friendly attitude;

-- the best approach seems to be one that would make it clear to the Turkish Government that we are not going to let them off the hook, and that we will keep up the pressure on them (but without the glare of publicity); if they really need money to solve the collection and control problem, we ought to offer it.

NOTE: The best solution under the circumstances of the meeting would be agreement not to threaten sanctions and to allow the situation to calm for several months. This should be coupled with agreement to meet again in November, at which time we will know whether the key licensing bill will be passed, how effective the current crop collection process has been, and it will also precede Prime Minister Demirel's scheduled visit to Washington in December.

You may wish to refer to the question of the US Congressional interest, and the probability that legislation will be passed calling on the President to suspend economic and military assistance with respect to any country he determines has failed to take appropriate steps to prevent narcotics flow (p. 6). You might suggest that the Working Party could be used as the best mechanism for arriving at an Administration position on such proposed legislation.

Before closing the meeting, you might wish to instruct the Working Party to prepare a report on other steps we are or should be taking on the opium/heroin question aside from Turkey. For example, what are the plans for UN actions, further actions in CCMS, and efforts to prevent the opium sources in South Asia from filling the gaps we hope will be left when the Turkish sources dry up. Such a report from the Working Party, providing a context, would be useful for reporting to the President the results of this meeting on Turkey.

A list of expected participants is at Tab D.

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SUMMARY OF WORKING PARTY REPORT

Our basic objective is to eliminate the illegal import of heroin into the US. We believe that a majority of the heroin (perhaps as much as 80% that enters the US through France can be traced to illicit Turkish opium. Thus, we had set as our objective the elimination of poppy planting in Turkey -- that the planting this fall be the last.

However, the latest decree of the Turkish Government permits planting through 1971 at least. On the positive side, the Turks have reduced the number of provinces growing poppies from 21 to 4 since 1967, and this year the Government is making intensive efforts for the first time to buy up the entire crop to keep it out of illicit channels. In previous years half the crop was diverted, but this year we estimate the proportion will be substantially reduced.

Nevertheless, the amount diverted this year is sufficient to provide enough heroin to meet at least a substantial part of the US demand for one year. In light of this, and Turkey's great importance as an illegal source of opium, it is extremely difficult to achieve anything but marginal success in eliminating other sources from illicit traffic unless Turkey's illicit traffic is cut.

Production of Opium in developing countries in the Near East, South and Southeast Asia is in flux, and the increased amounts available are entirely capable of filling the gaps left by the elimination of illicit Turkish opium. Since we have been unsuccessful in achieving a sudden and dramatic termination of Turkish opium production, there is considerable doubt whether the enormous network of processors and smugglers could be flushed out and suppressed in such a way as to have a significant impact on their ability to move operations to many other opium sources. Therefore, even if there was no more opium production in Turkey as of next year, we have no basis to conclude that there will be any reduction in heroin imports into the US in the foreseeable future as a result of fulfilling that goal for Turkey.

Five alternative goals are listed on p. 10. Two put the prime stress on the elimination of Turkish opium production (legal and illegal), while another two put the prime stress on eliminating the diversion into illicit channels or the legal opium crop. The fifth seeks an end to illegal opium by 1973 by either of the two methods at the option of the Turks.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Four alternative methods of attaining the chosen goal are set out on pp. 12-16. The "stick" approach would deny or substantially reduce accession to Turkish AID requests, including the current request for wheat under PL 480. The "carrot" approach attempts to create a cooperative atmosphere by eliminating unilateral US pressure, and by providing substantial financial inducements to the Turks. The third approach, the "carrot/stick," combines both incentives and denials by first increasing our support of Turkish military interests and almost simultaneously diminishing our assistance to other elements in Turkey. The final approach is a continuation of the present program (including an offer of up to \$5 million).

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Aug 7

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
MEMORANDUM FOR

MEMBERS OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK  
FORCE ON HEROIN

SUBJECT: Turkey and Illicit Opium

At my request the Chairman of the Working Party of our Task Force has prepared the enclosed memorandum which considers alternative goals and methods of implementation with respect to our efforts to eliminate Turkey as a source of illicit opium. In the light of recent developments, I think it would be desirable to convene a meeting of the Task Force during the course of next week. The Working Party's memorandum should serve as the basis for our discussion, which should result in an agreed course of action for the coming months.

My office will be in contact with yours in order to work out the most convenient date and time for the meeting.

  
Henry A. Kissinger

Enclosure

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SECRET Attachment

## WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON HEROIN

Meeting of June 9, 1970, at 3 pm

The White House Task Force on Heroin met for 75 minutes in the Roosevelt Room. The meeting was chaired, in Dr. Kissinger's absence, by Dr. Moynihan; a list of participants is attached.

\* \* \* \* \*

### Summary Conclusions

1. The State Department will cable Embassy Ankara and request an assessment of how the Turks are complying with their commitment to buy up the entire current poppy harvest. In addition, Ambassador Handley will be instructed to consult with Prime Minister Demirel to reach agreement on the scope and nature of the expected Turkish announcement at the CCMS meeting.
2. NATO countries should be advised of our strong interest in assuring that the CCMS meeting on June 18 is productive, and that all contribute. No mention will be made of the US-Turkish arrangements to those countries not already informed.
3. As Chairman of the Task Force's Working Party, Mr. Schwartz will prepare a list of areas in which we might apply pressure on the Turks; this should include things we could do to the Turks, for the Turks, and things we could withdraw from them.

\* \* \* \* \*

### Summary Record

At the Chairman's request, Mr. Richardson reviewed and brought up to date the points in his memo of May 19. He concluded that the decision was made to open a multilateral channel because that would enable the Turks to move faster toward elimination of opium production than in response to direct bilateral US pressure. The CCMS meeting is a vehicle to create a forum for the Turks to announce further measures as well as to move toward a wider international conference on the entire drug problem. Mr. Kleindienst asked if this was considered the best approach solely because of the political problems within Turkey. In response, Mr. Richardson said this was the result of the very limited bilateral US pressure which could be used as leverage with the Turks; to press harder would be counterproductive. Also, the move to the multilateral would enable other countries to bring

CONFIDENTIAL

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- 2 -

pressure on the Turks, and would enable the Turks to be in the company of others in taking its own steps.

After a brief discussion of the arrangements for the CCMS meeting, the Chairman raised the question of the proposed world ban on opium, as outlined in Mr. Richardson's memorandum. Mr. Finch commented that at this time there is really no effective substitute for opium, and that there would be a host of domestic problems relating to such a position (including the various state laws on the subject). Dr. Egeberg expanded on these comments, noting that his preliminary soundings in the medical community revealed very stiff opposition to any such suggestion. Opium is used in twenty different medical preparations by 2-4 million people per year, and there is no effective substitute for its pain-killing and euphoric qualities. The Chairman suggested that, while it would be useful to raise the question generally in the CCMS meeting, it probably would not be productive to take further soundings within the US at this time. In discussion later in the meeting, Mr. Finch and Dr. Egeberg agreed, and Mr. Finch said that HEW would provide medical advice to Dr. Moynihan for the CCMS meeting.

Mr. Kleindienst emphasized that forceful action was needed with respect to the Turks and other countries; that at the moment these countries considered it in their interest not to eliminate production. Mr. Rossides picked up this theme, noting the corruption in opium traffic in Turkey. He referred to Secretary Kennedy's view that next year the AID program for Turkey should be held up if there was not satisfactory improvement in the situation. Following the Chairman's expression of concern that the Turks might not in fact be collecting the entire poppy harvest, Mr. Rossides suggested that the Defense Department consider working closer with the Turkish military on the opium problem. Mr. Richardson thought this suggestion was worth pursuing.

The Chairman referred to a recent conversation he had with the President on the status of the heroin elimination efforts, and also noted that he was unhappy with the apparent lack of vigor with which Ambassador Handley was pursuing this matter. Mr. Kleindienst said we needed a very active Ambassador in Ankara. Mr. Richardson said he was satisfied with the Ambassador's performance, and that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister both emphasized to him that the Ambassador had been persistent on the opium question. Further, the Demirel Government would fall if it appeared that he responded to direct US pressure on this. Mr. Kleindienst asked if that assessment assumed that, if Demirel falls, the next government would not be as friendly toward the US. Mr. Richardson said that was correct, unless the generals take over.

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- 3 -

The Chairman asked Mr. Richardson to describe the commitment the Turks have made to us. Mr. Richardson said it was not very clear: at a minimum they will reduce the number of provinces for 1972 to one; at a maximum, elimination in 1971; and the middle ground would be reduction in 1971 to one province. They have been evasive, but they promised some action at the CCMS meeting. (There was a brief discussion of the degree of interest held by the other NATO countries, and of the possibility of suggesting a survey of the narcotic problem in the NATO armed forces.)

Mr. Kleindienst opined that the CCMS would not accomplish anything, that the meeting would merely deplore the problem and agree to meet again. Mr. Richardson reviewed the strategic importance to the US of a strong Turkish ally, and the delicate political balance within Turkey. Rhetorically, he asked whether Mr. Kleindienst had any alternative suggestions as to how better to accomplish the task of eliminating the opium problem.

The Chairman concluded the meeting by summarizing the conclusions noted above.

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Expected Participants at August 17 Heroin Task Force Meeting

**White House:** Mr. Krogh (for Mr. Ehrlichman)  
Mr. Blaney (for Dr. Moynihan)

**State:** Under Secretary Johnson  
Ambassador Handley  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Martin Herz,  
(Acting Chairman of the Working Party)

**Justice:** The Attorney General  
BNDD Director John Ingersol

**Defense:** Admiral Mack  
Mr. Bartimo

**HEW:** Secretary Richardson

**CIA:** Mr. Helms

**Treasury:** Assistant Secretary Rossides  
Mr. Liddy

25X1